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Abstract The aim of this paper is to show that a comprehensive account of the role
of representations in science should reconsider some neglected theses of the clas-
sical philosophy of science proposed in the first decades of the twentieth century.
More precisely, it is argued that the representational accounts of Helmholtz and Hertz,
in which the concept of structure-preservation plays an essential role, still deserve
attention for contemporary debates. Following Reichenbach, structure-preserving
representations provide a useful device for formulating an up-to-date version of a
(relativized) Kantian a priori. An essential feature of modern scientific representa-
tions is their mathematical character. That is, representations can be conceived as
(partially) structure-preserving maps or functions. This observation suggests an inter-
esting but neglected perspective on the history and philosophy of this concept, namely,
that structure-preserving representations are closely related to a priori elements of
scientific knowledge. Reichenbach’s early theory of a relativized constitutive but non-
apodictic a priori component of scientific knowledge provides a further elaboration of
Kantian aspects of scientific representation. To cope with the dynamic aspects of the
evolution of scientific knowledge, Cassirer proposed a re-interpretation of the concept
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of representation that conceived of a particular representation as only one phase in
a continuous process determined by pragmatic considerations. Pragmatic aspects of
representations are further elaborated in the classical account of C.I. Lewis and the
more modern of Hasok Chang who characterized in certain relativized representational
a priori assumptions as pragmatically justified metaphysical arguments.
Keywords Representation · Relative a priori · Structure preservation · Ernst Cassirer ·
Hasok Chang · Hans Reichenbach · Clarence Irving Lewis
1 On the vicissitudes of the concept of representation in twentieth
century philosophy of science
The concept of representation has not yet found a secure place on the agenda of
philosophy of science. Some philosophers have flatly denied that it could be of any
use in epistemology or philosophy of science. They have claimed that the concept
of representation leads us into a hopeless maze of pseudo-questions without answers.
According to them, epistemology based on the notions of negotiation and interpretation
should replace epistemological accounts based on “representation”.
One such philosopher was Richard Rorty. According to him, there were two
different camps in philosophy: one was the reactionary group of representation-
alists who belonged to the past; and the other consisted of “progressive”, i.e.,
anti-representationalist philosophers who Rorty considered the philosophers for the
twenty-first century:
Representationalists [are those philosophers] who find it fruitful to think of mind
or language as containing representations of reality. [Anti-representationalist
philosophers] attempt to eschew discussions of realism by denying that the notion
of „representation“… has any useful role in philosophy. Representationalists
typically think that controversies between idealists and realists were fruitful and
interesting (my emphasis). Antirepresentationalists typically think both sets of
controversies pointless (Rorty 1991, p. 2).
According to Rorty, the typical adherents of representationalism in the twentieth cen-
tury were Frege, Russell, Husserl, Tarski, and Carnap. In contrast, Quine, Sellars, and
Strawson were said to be the pioneers of the new anti-representationalist dogma.
Obviously, there is something wrong with Rorty’s simple binary classification. Take,
for instance, the case of Carnap. During his whole philosophical career this allegedly
arch-representationalist maintained that the traditional debate between idealism and
realism was pointless. Already in the Aufbau, one finds the thesis:
… the so-called epistemological schools of realism, idealism, and phenomenal-
ism agree within the field of epistemology. Construction theory (= the Aufbau’s
theory of constitution) represents the neutral foundation which they have in com-
mon. They diverge only in the field of metaphysics, that is to say (if they are
meant to be epistemological schools of thought), only because of a transgression
of their proper boundaries. Aufbau (1928, § 178).
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The concept of representation has a rich history that has been completely ignored by
many self-proclaimed anti-representationalists. For instance, Rorty’s contention that
representationalism subscribes to a copy theory of knowledge according to which the
aim of scientific knowledge was to produce an accurate copy of the world is quite
wrong. Kant had vigorously argued against any kind of “kopeyliche Betrachtung”
(“copy-like consideration”) (cf. Kant 1787, A318/B375).1 Irrespective of all their
internal differences and their various deviations from Kant, all neo-Kantians took this
doctrine to heart, and they all emphasized that representation did not have the intention
to produce an accurate copy of the world—in contradiction to Rorty’s claim that all
“representationalists” subscribed to this thesis. Rorty was not interested, however, in
details concerning matters of representation. Instead, he was content with sweeping
generalities, as is already shown by his assessment of Carnap’s philosophy.
According to Rorty, we should fall back onto a more or less trivial concept of
representation:
We should restrict the term “representation” to things like maps and codes -
things for which we can spell out rules of projection which pair objects with
other objects, and thus embody criteria of accurate representation. If we extend
the notion of representation beyond such things, we shall burden ourselves with
a lot of philosophical worries we need not have. In particular, if we worry about
what rules of projection connect sentences like “F = MA” with bits of reality,
we get nowhere (Rorty 1993, p. 126).
Rorty gave no reason for why “we get nowhere” when we worry about what rules of
projection connect sentences like F = MA with what bit of reality. Moreover, he gave
no hint what to do philosophically with sentences such as F = MA, which apparently
correspond somehow with bits of reality and form an essential component of our sci-
entific knowledge, the interpretation of which remains an essential task of philosophy
of science.
Today, after more than 30 years since Rorty put forward his onslaught on the concept
of representation, his attack seems rather dated. The concept of representation is still
very much alive and on the agenda of philosophy of science, as is evidenced by the
wealth of recent books and papers on this topic.2
The tides have changed, and for some time we have been experiencing a new vogue
in representationalist philosophy. Today, a philosopher of science would hardly offer an
1 According to Kant, knowledge does not intend to yield a copy of what is known but rather to understand its
“architecture”. This thesis was a leit-motif of Ernst Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian “critical theory” of science. In his
work, Cassirer emphasized the importance of this insight of Kant by repeatedly conceiving of “architecture”
as “functional architecture”.
2 Without claiming completeness or judging their importance, let me just mention the following book-
length treatises: Giovanni Boniolo , On Scientific Representations. From Kant to a New Philosophy of
Science (2007), Ronald Giere, Scientific Perspectivism (2006), Steven French, The Structure of the World,
Metaphysics and Representation (2014), Bas van Fraassen, Scientific Representation (2006).
An early voice against Rorty’s “anti-representationalist” crusade was Ian Hacking’s Representing and
Intervening (Hacking 1983). According to Hacking “The first peculiarly human invention is representation.
Once there is a practice of representing, a second-order concept follows in train. This is the concept of
reality, a concept which has content only when there are first-order representations.” (Hacking 1983, p.
136). For a discussion of Hacking’s thesis, see Rheinberger (2010, chapter 6).
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openly anti-representational account that claims the concept of representation should
play no role in philosophy of science.
This fact does not imply that we already know well the role of representation
in science and how this concept works. As Giere pointed out, the opinion is still
widely held “that scientists represent the world primarily in linguistic terms and so
that scientific representation is to be understood as a two-place relationship between
linguistic entities and the world” (cf. Giere 2006, p. 62). This opinion may not be
completely wrong but is at most only the beginning of a satisfying answer.
Giere’s suggestion to shift the focus of the discussion on the practice of scien-
tific representing is certainly a step in the right direction but nevertheless leaves out
an essential feature of modern scientific representation, namely, its mathematical
character, which is encapsulated in the fact that representations in science can
be mathematically conceived as (partially) structure-preserving maps or functions.
Acknowledging the essential role of mathematics for scientific representations does
not go against the practical character of mathematics. On the contrary, emphasizing
the role of mathematics in matters of scientific representations opens an interesting
neglected perspective on the history and philosophy of this concept, namely, that
representations as (partially) structure-preserving maps are closely related to the a
priori elements of scientific knowledge. This thesis may be elucidated by briefly recall-
ing an essential ingredient of Kant’s original account that still plays an essential role
in the contemporary discussion of the a priori, namely, the role the a priori plays in
the constitution of the objects of science. For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to
address Euclidean geometry as a typical example of a constitutive a priori. For Kant,
Euclidean geometry of space functioned as a constitutive framework for physics that
was not empirical; rather, it first rendered possible properly empirical discoveries (cf.
Friedman 2001, p. 62). Euclidean geometry can be characterized as a representational
a priori in that it enables us to represent (and thereby to constitute) physical phenom-
ena such as the paths of particles, their velocities, and the forces that act on them
geometrically, i.e., by certain structures of a mathematical space—for instance, by
vectors, tensors, and other geometrical constructs.3 How this is done is described in
terms of (partial) structure preservation and related mathematical concepts.4
After the advent of Einstein’s relativity theories, one knows, however, that the con-
stitutive representational framework of Euclidean geometry is not (as Kant thought)
the only possible one. There is more than one constitutive geometrical framework, and
these different frameworks compete with each other with respect to simplicity, fruit-
fulness, precision, and possibly other theoretical and practical virtues. The plurality of
different constitutive frameworks leads to a competition between them. For the philo-
sophical discussion concerning the role of a priori aspects of scientific knowledge, this
means that pragmatic aspects of the a priori become increasingly important in post-
Kantian philosophy of science (see Sects. 4, 5). More precisely, I address this issue
3 There is no reason to expect that every constitutive a priori (Kantian or post-Kantian) is representational
in the sense just described. For instance, Einstein’s “light principle”, which is a constitutive principle of
relativity theory, is not a representational a priori principle.




of the pragmatic relation among constitution, representation, and (partial) structure
preservation as follows.
The next section recalls that the origins of the project of conceiving of rep-
resentation as an essentially practical relation with more than two components.
This project can be traced back (in embryonic form) to the very beginnings of a
modern post-Kantian representational account of scientific cognition and scientific
knowledge in particular, namely, the one that Helmholtz’s presented in The Facts of
Perception (Von Helmholtz 1878). Helmholtz’s approach was essentially Kantian,5
in that it was based on the Kantian distinction between the two worlds of noumena
and phenomena.6 As will be explained in more detail in the next section, the world
of noumena is represented by the world of phenomena structured by a similarity
structure. This similarity structure can be understood as a kind of very simple spatial
structure. Second, Helmholtz’s approach was based on a mathematical account of
representation that described representations as (partially) structure-preserving maps
between two realms (in Helmholtz’s case the worlds of noumena and phenomena).
These two aspects of Helmholtz’s approach nicely match, since the notion of (partial)
structure preservation can be conceived as a form a (relativized and historized) form
of a Kantian a priori. Helmholtz was just an early member the group of scientists and
philosophers who attempted to update Kant’s philosophy of science in such a way
that it took into account the achievements of post-Kantian science.
The aim of this paper is to bring together these two strands of thought in order to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the role of representations in scientific knowledge.
Painted with a broad brush, scientific theories are representations, i.e., conceptual tools
made for achieving cognitive and other pragmatic aims. From such a pragmatic point
of view, representations do not simply represent the world as it is but contain rules for
interacting with it, meaning that there is no (or should be no) exclusive disjunction
between “representing” and “intervening”. Rather, representations in science are to be
thought of as “intervening representations”.
Scientific theories do not offer true descriptions of the world, nor the most truth-like
ones, they are pictures of nature that allow one to give a uniform and comprehensive
account of the totality of phenomena. Theories are attempts, made by the cognizing
subject, to grasp the empirical data and give them cognitive significance. The role of
representations is not limited to recording in a coherent and economic way what is
already empirically known. Representations also have to predict future events.
5 This holds even though Helmholtz did not agree with all Kantian theses, for instance, according to
standard scholarship, he denied the a priori character of Euclidean geometry. Recently, Friedman and
Ryckman aimed to show that Helmholtz’s theory of space actually was in line with a Kantian philosophy
of science in which the original apodictic Kantian a priori is replaced by relativized more flexible a priori.
The general Kantianism of Helmholtz to be discussed in this paper does not depend on this (cf. Friedman
1997; Ryckman 2005).
6 Whether Helmholtz’s “2-world”-interpretation of Kant’s account (the world of noumena and the world of
phenomena, respectively) faithfully preserves Kant’s original intentions may well be doubted. Most experts
claim that Kant’s account was more subtle than Helmholtz realized. Further, one may criticize Helmholtz’s
understanding of Kantian “Dinge-an-sich” and “Erscheinungen”. For a detailed, recent discussion of these
issues, see Oberdan (2015). These problems need not concern us here.
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Representations do not tell us how things are in themselves but, in Kantian jargon,
how “our conceptions of things” are. They have a double face: they are both what one
knows and that by means of which one knows. They are hypothetical constructions
made to grasp reality. Thus, reality plays an indispensable role in evaluating them.
Only by appealing to experience they can be confirmed or disconfirmed.
If the Kantian character of (partial) structure preservation is recognized as an essen-
tial feature of scientific representation in general, then it becomes plausible that other
features of scientific representation may be fruitfully conceived of in a broadly Kantian
perspective. The general claim of this paper is to show that this is indeed the case.
In Sect. 3, which deals with some aspects of the early Reichenbach’s philosophy
of science, I would like to show that the issue of structure preservation in scientific
representations is closely related to a classical topic in twentieth century philosophy
of science, namely, what to do with the Kantian legacy of the a priori component
of scientific knowledge. On the one hand, the traditional apodictic and constitutive
Kantian a priori had turned obsolete; on the other hand, some kind of a flexible his-
torized a priori was arguably indispensable for a rich and comprehensive description
of scientific knowledge.7
Any representational account, by distinguishing between the realms of the rep-
resented and the representing, seems to be threatened by the fundamental skeptical
objection that there is no guarantee that the account establishes a valid connection
between the two realms. The neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer in Substance
and Function (1910) addressed this issue and noted that representation in science
should be conceived as homogeneous representation (in a sense to be specified) for
which this general skepticism turned out to be pointless. Cassirer’s argument is treated
in Sect. 4 and naturally leads to a pragmatic account of representation. This connec-
tion is more explicitly elaborated in Sect. 5 by relying on the classical account of C.I.
Lewis and the more modern of Hasok Chang.
2 Towards a pluridimensional account of representation: from
Helmholtz to Giere
As a point of departure for elucidating the role of representation in modern science, let
us recall Helmholtz’s famous account of perceptual knowledge that clearly exhibits
both the Kantian and mathematical aspects:
Our sensations are indeed effects produced in our organs by external causes, and
how such an effect expresses itself naturally depends quite essentially upon the
kind of apparatus upon which the effect is produced. Inasmuch as the quality of
our sensation gives us a report of what is peculiar to the external influence by
which it is excited, it may count as a symbol of it, but not as an image. For from
an image one requires some kind of alikeness with the object fo which it is an
image … But a sign need not have any kind of similarity at all with what it is the
7 This paper deals with only Reichenbach’s earliest account of coordination as a priori, which he presented
in Reichenbach (1920). As is well known, later, under the influence of Schlick and Carnap, Reichenbach
considerably changed his view (cf. Reichenbach 1924, 1928; Friedman 1999a, b).
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sign of. The relation between the two of them is restricted to the fact that like
objects exerting an influence under like circumstances evoke like signs, and that
therefore unlike signs always correspond to unlike influences (Von Helmholtz
1878, p. 122).
Originally, Helmholtz conceived of his account as an account of perception only. But, it
is easily generalized from perception to a model of cognition and knowledge in general.
That is to say, replacing “perception” with “cognition”, we arrive at a symbolic, more
precisely, structuralist account of cognition and knowledge. According to this account,
we never know the essence of objects (whatever this may be) but at most the structural
relations existing between them.8
Helmholtz’s 2-level representational account may be considered a radical (arguably
oversimplified) Kantianism: It conceives perception, and more generally cognition, as
a map W——s——>S between the world W of objects (the “real world”) and the
world S of sensations or symbols. On W and S are defined binary likeness relations
~W and ~S, respectively. If a ~W b and x ~S y obtain, this is to be interpreted as the state
of affairs that “the objects a and b are similar to each other” and “the sensations x and
y are similar to each other”. The only law that a good representation, i.e., an accurate
“world picture”, has to satisfy requires that it provides us with a map W——s——>S
that is structure-preserving in the following elementary sense:
∀a∀b (IF a ∼W b THEN s (a) ∼S s (b)) (∗)
A robustly realistic interpretation of (*) would assume that the relation ~S between
our sensations “reflects” a structurally similar relation ~W between objects of the
noumenal world. This interpretation is not, however, the only possibility: A more
cautious reading would be that the relation ~S induces a relation ~W on the elements
of the world W by the stipulation a ~W b := s(a) ~S s(b).9 This reading is not simply to
be characterized as “weaker”; it also emphasizes the constitutive, “order-generating”
role of representation.10
8 Oberdan recently pointed out that the path from Helmholtz’s structural theory of perception to the struc-
tural account of knowledge of early logical empiricism (particularly Schlick) was far from straight and
direct. For the details see Oberdan (2015).
9 Reichenbach seems to have favored an interpretation of this kind when noting that by empirical measure-
ment “[t]he only fact that can be determined is whether two numerical values derived from two different
measurements are the same. We cannot know whether a coordination with this result always refers to the
same element in the real world” (Reichenbach 1920, p. 45).
10 It is worth mentioning that the aspect of order generation (or, more generally, structure generation)
plays an important role for the theory of mathematical representation. It is not restricted to the very simple
example of Helmholtz’s similarity. Mathematically, the following examples are a bit more advanced: Let
X——f——>Y be a set-theoretical map between sets X and Y, where Y is endowed with an order relation
≤Y. Then ≤Y induces an order relation ≤X on X by the stipulation x ≤X x* iff f(x) ≤Y f(x*). Analogous
constructions may be carried out for many other mathematical structures, e.g., topological ones. Whether
such a structure-induction makes sense empirically has to be determined empirically. Reichenbach was well
aware of this fact, for instance, when he asserted that the difference between rational and irrational numbers
does not make sense for empirical realms. In philosophy of physics the general problem of which elements
of a formalism correspond to something in the real world and which do not has been called the problem of
“surplus formal structure” (cf. Redhead 1975, p. 88).
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The model underlying Helmholtz’s structural realist account of perception and,
more generally, of cognition is, of course, very abstract. Later authors have fur-
ther elaborated its basic elements, such as symbolism, structural realism, and
epistemologico-activism (pragmatism). As an early example of such an elaboration,
one may consider Hertz’s well-known thesis that brings the conceptual and experimen-
tal activity of the symbolizing subject more clearly into play than did Helmholtz11:
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and form that which
we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are
always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured
must be the images of the consequents. In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought.
Experience teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied, and hence that such
a conformity does in fact exist (Hertz 1894, p. 1).
Hertz’s informal description of the representational activity of science may be trans-
lated into a diagrammatical language as follows: Let the set of “external objects” be
denoted by E and the set of “images or symbols” be denoted by S. Then, the follow-
ing commutative diagram may be used to capture the essential structure of Hertz’s
account:
which is to be read as follows: Relating an external object e to its symbolic image
s(e) and submitting s(e) to an symbolic calculation c leading to the symbol c•s (e)
amounts to the same as submitting the external object e to the empirical process p with
the result of p(e) and then submitting p(e) to the symbolic calculation c leading to the
final result of c•s (e).
It should be noted that Hertz goes well beyond Helmholtz’s approach12 by empha-
sizing the possibility of several different images or symbols S, S′,… of one and the
same domain E. Diagrammatically, this possibility amounts to the existence of other
diagrams of the same type:
11 It has been noted that Helmholtz’s concept of “pictures” and Hertz’s concept of “symbols” are different
(cf. Heidelberger 1998, p. 21ff). This does not affect the present discussion, however. The important point
is that both can be couched in the framework of structure-preserving representations and commutative
diagrams.
The physicist has to assess which picture is the best according to the criteria of permissibility, correctness
and adequacy (cf. Hertz 1894; Lützen 2005; Majer 1998).
12 In (**), Helmholtz’s approach is represented by the diagram E——s——>S, which may be conceived
as a part of the entire commutative diagram.
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The existence of several pictures leads, as Hertz observed, to an inextricable
underdetermination of scientific theorizing that can be reduced only by pragmatic con-
siderations: “One picture may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another.
Only by gradually testing many pictures can we finally succeed in obtaining the most
appropriate” (Hertz 1894, p. 3). By emphasizing the active role of the “picturing” or
“symbolizing” subject, Hertz’s account goes well beyond that of Helmholtz’s. This
account has been aptly described by Majer as follows:
According to Hertz, usually we encounter the world actively, creatively and
con–structively, in accordance with our manual and mental abilities; we are not
simply passive receivers and describers … .(Majer 1998, p. 235).
A common idealizing factor of Helmholtz’s and Hertz’s representational accounts is
approximation, which these authors accept without problematizing it. Let us consider
in detail the case of Hertz. The essential feature of this account is that the various
mappings in the diagrams of type (**) do commute in the sense that the two paths
of (**) from the upper left to the lower right vertex yield the very same results. In
reality, this claim is a highly counterfactual idealization, i.e., theoretical predictions and
experimental results almost never exactly coincide (and if they do, this coincidence is
to be considered merely a fortunate coincidence). This conclusion is, of course, nothing
new for scientists and philosophers of science, as is witnessed by Pierre Duhem and
many others. At various occasions in his opus magnum The aim and structure of
Physical Theory, Duhem asserted that the correspondence between “practical facts”
and “symbolic facts” established by an empirical theory is of such a kind that
A symbolic formula … can be translated into concrete facts in an infinity of
different ways, because all these disparate facts admit the same theoretical inter-
pretation (Duhem 1954, p. 150)
Similarly, he asserted that
The same practical fact may correspond to an infinity of logically incompatible
theoretical facts; the same group of concrete facts may be made to correspond in
general not with a single symbolic judgment but with an infinity of judgments
different from one another and logically in contradiction with one another (ibid.,
152).
In a diagrammatic language, Duhem’s theses amount to the claim that in the diagrams
(**) and (**)′, the maps s and s′ are not 1-1 but many-valued. Moreover, only under
strong idealizing assumptions can these diagrams be considered commutative.
It has occasionally been objected against Helmholtz’s approach that it ignores the
essential role of the perceiving subject. This objection is a bit unfair. After all, the
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representing map between the world W of transcendent objects and the world S of
sensations is not simply there, it is created by us, depending at least partially on
the nature of our perceptual and conceptual apparatus (cf. Helmholtz 1977 (1878),
p. 121). Moreover, Helmholtz repeatedly emphasized the importance of the specific
circumstances that accompany the production of signs and how relevant it is to vary
the circumstances in order to find the relevant aspects of the appearances that remain
invariant:
For if comprehending (“begreifen”) means forming concepts (“Begriffe”), and
in the concept we gather together and bind together whatever like characteristics
they bear, it then results quite analogously that the concept of a series of appear-
ances alternating in time must seek to bind together that which remains alike in
all stages (Helmholtz 1977 (1878), pp. 138–139).13
In summary, Helmholtz did not completely ignore the empirical and pragmatic aspects
of the production of cognitively and perceptually relevant signs or symbols. It may
be that they did not play the role they deserve in Helmholtz’s and Hertz’s accounts;
however, they certainly are not completely absent, and it seems not too difficult to
make them more explicit. Thereby, one may hope to arrive at a concept of scien-
tific representation that does full justice to the role of scientific practice in matters
representational.
One influential proposal of how such a concept can be achieved is Ronald Giere’s
tetradic account of scientific representation (cf. Giere 2004). Giere proposed to con-
ceive scientific representations as tetradic relations of the following kind:
S uses X to represent W for purposes P. (∗ ∗ ∗)
Mildly formalized, this account amounts to conceiving of scientific representations
as tetradic relations R(S, X, W, P) whose variables can take the following values: S
can be anything from an individual scientist to a scientific community, understood
synchronically or diachronically; X is a model (or a class of models) in a broad sense,
i.e., X may be a linguistic or a mathematical device that serves a representational
purpose of some kind; W stands for a piece of the real world, a (kind of) thing, event,
or system; and finally, P is the purpose for which S intends to use this gadget.
This pluridimensional account of scientific representation may be considered a con-
siderable generalization of the original dyadic approach. Nevertheless, the original
2-dimensional approach and a 4-dimensional (or even n-dimensional, n≥4) approach
may be considered to be of the same kind, namely, accounts that conceive of a represen-
tation as a relation between two (or more) ontologically different realms. Helmholtz’s
13 Schlick, as one of the editors of Helmholtz’s Epistemological Writings, approvingly comments on this
remark: “The thought expressed here by Helmholtz is a fundamental insight of all epistemology. It lies at
the base already of Plato’s theory of Ideas… and likewise at that of the modern theory of science.” Schlick
in Helmholtz (1921, p. 179).
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original 2-worlds interpretation of Kant is only a prototype of a family of more elab-
orated accounts of this kind.14
3 Structure-preserving representation as a relative a priori: the early
Reichenbach’s connecting principles
The purest and technically most sophisticated structure-preserving representations
appear in mathematics under various names, such as functions, homomorphisms, map-
pings, or, most recently and most generally, functors in the sense of category theory (cf.
Mac Lane 1986; Bell 1986).15 It should be noted, however, that even in mathematics,
this concept exhibits those pragmatic features that Giere and others have identified as
essential for the pragmatic relevance of structure-preserving scientific representations,
namely, that representations are set up for certain purposes. Representations do not
exist an sich; they are intentional in a broad sense.
The early Reichenbach was the first to note that the issue of structure-preserving
representations is closely related to an issue that has occupied philosophy of science
for the last two hundred years, namely, the a priori elements in scientific knowledge
(cf. Reichenbach 1920).
The virtually ubiquitous presence of (partially) structure-preserving representations
(Zuordnungen) in empirical knowledge provides a good argument for the existence of
an a priori ingredient: Structure preservation may be conceived as a kind of relativized
Kantian a priori. That is to say, it may be fruitful for philosophy of science to conceive
of the phenomenon of structure preservation as a kind of Kantian a priori.16 This thesis
is in need of explication. For this purpose, it is expedient to take a closer look at the
account of the relative a priori of the early Reichenbach (1920).
According to Reichenbach, within the context of any given theory, there is a sharp
distinction between two essentially different types of axioms: Axioms of coordination
and axioms of connection. Typical (empirical) axioms of connection are, for instance,
the law F = ma in Newtonian mechanics, the equation pV = kT in the theory of ideal
gases or, according Reichenbach, Einstein’s equations of gravitation, which describe
“the special mathematical relation of the physical variables Rik to the physical variables
Tik and gik.” (Reichenbach 1920, p. 54)17 From these axioms of connection, one has
to distinguish the axioms (or principles) of coordination:
14 Indeed, one may consider Giere’s tetradic account to be a late sophisticated member of this family
of “Kantian” representations that began with Helmholtz’s representation: W corresponds to Helmholtz’s
“wirkliche Welt”, and X corresponds to his domain of “Erscheinungen”.
15 Perhaps the most spectacular singular result of twentieth century mathematics concerning representation
has been Stone’s representation theorem that establishes a faithful representation of the category of Boolean
algebras in terms of topological spaces by relating to every Boolean algebra B a topological space St(B)
(cf. Johnstone 1982).
16 I do not claim that partial structure-preservation must be conceived as a kind of Kantian a priori. One
may well ignore its Kantian aspects and treat it simply as a primitive feature of modern empirical theories.
In my opinion, this approach amounts, however, to an incomplete conception.
17 They do not concern us in this paper, although they have traditionally been more prominent in philosophy




The axioms of coordination … do not connect certain variables of state with
others but contain general rules according to which connections take place. In
the equations of gravitation, the axioms of arithmetic are presupposed as rules
of connection and are therefore coordinating principles of physics (Reichenbach
1920, p. 54).
At first glance, this claim may sound a bit confusing: Are the axioms of arithmetic
both rules of connection AND coordinating principles? In some sense, yes: First, the
axioms of arithmetic are rules of connection of mathematical objects, namely, they
describe how numbers, vectors, and tensors (as objects of mathematics) are added,
multiplied, and connected in other specific ways. Then, in a second step, these rules
also serve as coordinating principles, as they also govern the physical variables to
which the mathematical variables are coordinated.
The concept of (partial) structure preservation may help elucidate this issue. Con-
sider the most elementary case of length measurement of a certain domain D of physical
objects. According to the representational theory of measurement, this case amounts
to a coordination φ between objects d ∈ D and (real) numbers r ∈ R such that the con-
necting rules of both domains are respected. More precisely, the coordination ϕ has
to satisfy (among some other rules) the basic requirement of structure preservation:
ϕ(d1 ⊕ d2) 
 φ (d1) + φ (d2)
here ⊕ is the physical operation of concatenating material objects in an appropriate
way, and + is the familiar operation of numerical addition. This requirement of exten-
sionality may be considered a constitutive principle necessary for a magnitude that
can be interpreted as length. A physical magnitude that does not satisfy it cannot be
considered length. A slightly more complicated case is considered by Reichenbach:
[I]f a certain mathematical symbol is coordinated to a physical force, the proper-
ties of the mathematical vector must be ascribed to it in order to enable us to think
of this force as an object. In this case the axioms referring to vector operations
are constitutive principles, i.e., categories of physical concepts (Reichenbach
1920, p. 54)
Reichenbach’s approach can be described generally as follows: connection axioms
describe relations between objects of the same ontological realm—either between
physical magnitudes or between mathematical objects; on the other hand, coordina-
tion axioms stipulate relations between mathematical objects and physical objects,
respecting the respective connection axioms and thereby establishing a (partially)
structure preservation between the physical and mathematical ones.
Coordinating axioms are constitutive for all kinds of scientific objects qua scientific
objects. They are not apodictic but may change in the ongoing evolution of science.18
The task of the coordinating axioms of various kinds is to ensure the uniqueness of the
coordination between mathematical concepts and physical objects (cf. Reichenbach
18 Reichenbach was, of course, not the first to discover them: they already appear, though not under this
label, in the works of Helmholtz, Duhem and others, who did not distinguish them from connection axioms.
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1920, p. 57). Indeed, for Reichenbach to answer the question of how uniqueness of
coordination is achieved was to answer the crucial question for any epistemology:
How it is possible to achieve such a coordination (Zuordnung) in a consistent
manner? This question belongs in critical philosophy, for it is equivalent to Kant’s
question “How is natural science possible?” … We should like to stress that the
question is meaningful independently of any given answer and that there can be
no epistemology that ignores it. … (Reichenbach 1920, p. 46)
The first thing to note is that according to Reichenbach, Zuordnung in mathematics
and Zuordnung in physics were essentially different:
The coordination performed in a physical proposition … differs distinctly from
other kinds of coordination (such as coordination in mathematics). For example,
if two sets of points are given, we establish a correspondence between them by
coordinating to every point of one set a point of the other set. For this purpose,
the elements of each set must be defined; that is, for each element there must
exist another definition in addition to that which determines the coordination to
the other set. Reichenbach (1920, p. 37)
Actually, this model is an oversimplified model of how Zuordnung (coordination)
works in modern mathematics.19 It allows Reichenbach, however, to draw a strict line
between mathematical Zuordnung on the one hand and Zuordnung between math-
ematical concepts and physical objects on the other. According to him, the neat
concept of structure-preserving representation—as it is characteristic for modern
mathematics under different names such as (continuous) functions, homomorphisms,
or functors—is relevant for matters representational in the empirical sciences only in
a limited manner. Thus, the problem of coordination between the empirical and the
mathematical would remain a problem for philosophy of science even if the issue of
inner-mathematical representation is well understood.
Nevertheless, Reichenbach thinks it expedient to begin with a special case of a
“difficult” mathematical (coordination) Zuordnung in order to eventually explain the
essential difference between the two kinds of Zuordnung. I think it is useful to consider
this case in some detail in order to understand the intricacies of Reichenbach’s concept
of Zuordnung.
His example is concerned with “the coordination of the rational fractions to the
points of a straight line” (Reichenbach 1920, p. 37). First, he notes that all elements of
the straight line are well defined in advance of the task of coordinating all rationals with
(some of) them, since “we can say of any point of the plane whether or not it belongs to
the real line” (ibid.) Moreover, the points of the straight line are linearly ordered. Thus,
the representing mathematical structure of the straight line is, so to speak, already there,
and all its elements and relations are explicitly given, which also holds for the rational
numbers Q to be represented. Nevertheless, a unique Zuordnung of the rationals to the
19 Take for instance the already mentioned example of Stone’s representation of Boolean algebras B as
sets of “clopen” (= closed and open) subsets of a certain topological space St(B) called the Stone space of
B. It is hard to see what it would mean for the elusive structure of the Stone space St(B) (defined with the
help of B and the axiom of choice AC) to exist independently from B.
123
Synthese
reals seems not to be possible for several reasons. For example, as it stands, the choice
of the unit is completely arbitrary. We may represent the rational number 1 ∈ Q by any
real number whatsoever, which renders the representation of Q by R quite arbitrary.
As Reichenbach correctly noted, one has to find other relations of real numbers (and
rational numbers) to achieve uniqueness of coordination. The point is that this problem
is mathematical and can be solved mathematically. How this solution is to be achieved
need not be described in detail. In contrast, the unique coordination of physical objects
and mathematical concepts cannot be solved by purely mathematical means. Rather,
as Reichenbach notes somewhat cryptically, in the empirical sciences
… we are faced with the strange fact that in the realm of cognition two sets are
coordinated, one of which not only attains its order through this coordination, but
whose elements are defined by means of this coordination (Reichenbach 1920,
p. 40).
The coordination itself creates one of the sequences of elements to be coordinated,
which seems to render impossible any kind uniqueness, since there are no mathemat-
ical or perceptual means to achieve it. As Reichenbach put it, “Perception does not
determine reality”. Hallucinations are more than nothing. It depends on the context
whether or not they have to be taken into account.
Nevertheless, Reichenbach claims that there is a kind of determination of knowledge
by experience that enables us to achieve a unique coordination between the empirical
and the mathematical. This uniqueness, however, considerably differs from the purely
mathematically defined uniqueness discussed before.
The only fact can be determined in physics whether two numerical values derived
from two different measurements are the same. We cannot know whether a coor-
dination with this result always refers to some element in the real world. But
if the values obtained by the measurements are consistently the same, then the
coordination possesses that property which we call truth or objective validity.
Therefore, we define: Uniqueness of a cognitive coordination means that a phys-
ical variable of state is represented by the same value resulting from different
empiricial data (Reichenbach 1920, p. 45).
For Reichenbach, the essential problem to solve for philosophy of science or episte-
mology is to answer the following question:
How is it possible to achieve such a (unique) coordination in a consistent manner?
This question belongs in critical philosophy, for it is equivalent to Kant’s question
“How is natural science possible?” (Reichenbach (1920, p. 75))
Reichenbach’s answer to this question remains vague and unilluminating: “We see such
a way (to answer this question) in the application of the method of logical analysis
to epistemology.” (ibid. 74). Then, instead of giving a precise explication of how the
method of logical analysis achieves this, he is content to mention two rather different
successful applications: First, he boasts that he carried out a successful logical analysis
for the theory of probability (considered as a non-empirical theory); then, he credits
Einstein as having achieved the analogous result for the theory of relativity. Thereby,
Reichenbach contends that a truly modern philosophy of science can be characterized
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as a modernized Kantianism that is in close contact with science in the following
sense:
The results discovered by the positive sciences in continuous contact with expe-
rience presuppose principles the detection of which by means of logical analysis
is the task of philosophy (Reichenbach 1920, p. 75).
In summary, Reichenbach subscribed to a strict distinction between Zuordnung in
mathematics and Zuordnung as a method of constitution in physics (and other empirical
sciences).20 This stance is in stark opposition to the one that his teacher Cassirer had
put forward, namely, that the constitutional methods in both realms are the same: In
his seminal paper Kant und die moderne Mathematik (Cassirer 1907), Cassirer put it
in this way:
Only when we have understood that the same foundational syntheses on which
logic and mathematics rest also govern the scientific construction of experien-
tial knowledge, that only they enable us to speak of a strict, lawful ordering
among appearances and therewith of their objective meaning: only then the true
justification of the principles is attained (Cassirer 1907, p. 44).
What exactly these same foundational syntheses are is left open by Cassirer here. It
seems plausible to assume, however, that some kind of coordinating principles are
among them. Cassirer agrees with Reichenbach in that philosophy has to be in close
contact with science in order to fulfil this task.
4 Overcoming scepticism: Cassirer’s concept of homogeneous
representation
Rorty was not the first nor only one who distinguished between “representationalists”
and “anti-representationalists” in order to organize the history of philosophy and par-
ticularly epistemology in broad outline. In Substance and Function, Cassirer (1910,
p. 282ff) undertook a similar endeavor. Needless to say, Cassirer’s conclusions with
respect to the feasibility of representationalism considerably differed from that of
Rorty.
In contrast to Rorty, Cassirer distinguished between an aporetic “metaphysical”
concept of representation and a “good” critical one:
In metaphysical doctrines, the “presentation”, (Vorstellung) refers to the object,
which stands behind it. Thus the “sign” here is of an entirely different nature
than the signified, and belongs to another realm of being. Precisely in this lies
the real riddle of knowledge (Cassirer 1910, p. 282).
This conceptualization of representation (of which Helmholtz’s two-worlds Kantian-
ism is perhaps the clearest example) is threatened by an obvious skeptical objection:
20 Padovani claims that Reichenbach’s concept of Zuordnung was originally (before 1920) inspired by
the concept that Cassirer presented in his Kant und die moderne Mathematik (Cassirer 1907) and then
elaborated in Substance and Function (Cassirer 1910) (cf. Padovani 2011).
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… for what assurance have we that the symbol of being, which we believe we
have in our presentation, genuinely reproduces the content of being, and does
not misrepresent its essential features? (Cassirer 1910, p. 284).
A “critical account” of representation (like that of Cassirer) is not exposed to this
objection:
The new meaning, which the criticism of knowledge gives to the concept of
representation, removes this danger. It is now recognized that each particular
phase of experience has a “representative” character, in so far it refers to another
and finally leads by progress according to rule to the totality of experience. But
this reference beyond concerns only the transitions from one particular serial
member to the totality, to which it belongs, and to the universal rule governing
this totality. … It places the individual in the system. … (Cassirer 1910, p. 284).
In this way, Cassirer’s approach, usually characterized as “neo-Kantian” or “idealistic”
account, turns out to have something in common with pragmatism:
[Scientific] concepts are valid, not in that they copy a fixed, given being, but
insofar as they contain a plan for possible constructions of unity which must be
progressively verified in practice, in application to the empirical material. … We
need, not the objectivity of absolute things, but rather the objective determinate-
ness of the method of experience (Cassirer 1910, p. 322).
In summary, the pragmatic component of Cassirer’s account of the a priori is encap-
sulated in the claim that “valid” concepts contain “plans for possible constructions of
unity”. Concepts are “blueprints” for further experiences. In other words, they pro-
vide maps for the spaces of further possible actions and the experiences resulting from
them. This can be formulated as the thesis that concepts serve as representations.
Like all plans, concepts are based on certain a priori assumptions. They are devices
for achieving certain goals. For Cassirer, concepts were plans for constructing an ever-
more thorough unity of scientific knowledge. Hence, it does not seem inappropriate
to characterize Cassirer as a “theoretical pragmatist”21 for whom the aim of scientific
activity was not to produce a faithful description of the world but to bring about
increasingly comprehensive and unifying experiences.
From a contemporary point of view, Cassirer’s emphasis on coherence and com-
prehensiveness as the most important and most highly valued characteristics of the
scientific enterprise may be criticized as biased.22 The important common feature of
Cassirer’s Neokantianism and Lewis’s pragmatic scientific knowledge, however, is that
action and evaluation are essentially connected (cf. Lewis 1946, p. 5). Their accounts
21 In Substance and Function (Cassirer 1910, p. 318ff), it is explicitly stated that the “critical theory of
knowledge” (= Cassirer’s) is in line with Dewey’s.
22 The issue of the (dis)continuity of the evolution of scientific knowledge is vividly discussed in contem-
porary philosophy of science (cf. Friedman 2001; Chang 2008; Mormann 2012a, b). In his later philosophy,
Cassirer is actually less of a continuist than has been generally recognized. For instance, in his last book on
philosophy of science, Determinism and Indeterminism (Cassirer 1956 (1937)), he emphasized the neces-
sity “that somewhere in the process of knowledge we have to acknowledge real “mutations” that lead to
something new and independent.” (Cassirer 1956 (1937), p. 191).
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differ in how much continuity and coherence they expect the ongoing progress of
scientific to exhibits. As will be shown in the next section, Chang moves even further
away from any continuism.
5 Towards a pragmatic account of the a priori: clarence Irving Lewis
and Hasok Chang
During his day, Clarence Irving Lewis (1883–1964) was one of most prominent
American philosophers. Today, he is lesser known than the other three great clas-
sical pragmatists Peirce, James and Dewey, so some introductory remarks on his life
and philosophy may be in order.23 Lewis may be characterized as the most Kantian of
all pragmatists, although of a rather peculiar kind. He is reported to have characterized
himself as “a Kantian who disagrees with every sentence of the Critique of Pure Rea-
son.” Besides Peirce, he may be said to have been the “most logical” pragmatist. After
having finished his dissertation The Place of Intuition in Knowledge (1911) under
Josiah Royce, his research interests switched to logic. Much of his work sought to
overcome the shortcomings of standard extensional logic. Indeed, Lewis was one of
the founding fathers of modern modal logic. More generally, he addressed the ques-
tion of what should be considered the “correct” logic of science or of our everyday
reasoning as an empirical problem the solution to which had to take into account the
empirical facts of the practice of scientific investigation.
A first sketch of his theory of a pragmatic a priori is to be found in his paper A
Pragmatic Conception of the A priori (1922). In mature form, it is presented in Mind
and the World Order (1929, 1929 (1956)) (MWO). Further elaborations may be found
in his later book, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946).
Let us start with a quote from (MWO) in which he subscribed to a nonapodictic
interpretation of the a priori rather similar to the one that Reichenbach had put forward
earlier:
The a priori… represents the contribution of the mind itself to knowledge, it
does not require that this mind be universal, or absolute…. The determination
of the a priori is in some sense like free choice and deliberate action (MWO, pp.
231, 233).
Similar Reichenbach’s, Lewis’s a priori kept only the constitutive element of its Kan-
tian ancestor; apodicticity is given up, and intuition plays no role in it. For Lewis, the a
priori was a variable that might change over time. Even the a priori principles of logic
were not beyond the possibility of alteration. This possibility was not merely abstract:
23 For comprehensive presentations of Lewis’s life and work, the reader may consult Murphey (2005) or
Rosenthal (2007); for a succinct presentation of Lewis’s philosophy and a comparison of his views with
those of Carnap and Quine, the reader may consult Baldwin (2007). For a succinct, modern survey, see
Misak’s The American Pragmatists (Misak 2013). She locates Lewis’s pragmatism very close to logical
empiricism. Even more, she claims that “the logical empiricism drifted closer and closer to their pragmatist
cousins until the view were almost indistinguishable” (Misak 2013, p. 254). On the other hand, she draws a




Lewis was one of the leading figures in promoting alternative logics differing from
that of the Principia Mathematica.
Although no longer apodictic, Lewis’s a priori maintained a conditional kind of
necessity. The a priori was true no matter what experience might bring. The acceptance
of a concept as a priori was a matter of decision or legislation, something for which
there were alternatives but for which the criteria are not empirical but pragmatic. This
necessity of the a priori has nothing to do with inescapability:
The paradigm of the a priori in general is the definition. It has always been clear
that the simplest and most obvious case of truth which can be known in advance
of experience is the explicative proposition and those consequences of definition
which can be derived by purely logical analysis.
…
If experience were other than it is, the definition and its corresponding classifica-
tion might be inconvenient, useless, or fantastic, but it could not be false (MWO,
p. 239).
For Lewis, the best examples for such analytical a priori were provided by mathemat-
ics. According to him, the traditional conceptions of the a priori are the “historical
shadow of Euclidean geometry” (MWO, pp. 240–241). But, Euclidean geometry gave
the wrong impression that the a priori was unique and apodictic. The invention of
a plurality of non-Euclidean geometries evidenced that the true a priori of scientific
knowledge was an a priori of a different kind, which lacked uniqueness and apodictic-
ity (MWO, p. 242). Rather, an essential feature of the a priori component in knowledge
was that it could have been chosen differently. Although mathematics provided a good
example for a science in which the a priori element plays an important role, Lewis
emphasized that the a priori element in the empirical sciences went far beyond the
mathematical:
All order of sufficient importance to be worthy of the name of law depends
eventually upon some ordering by mind. Without initial principles by which we
guide our attack upon the welter of experience, it would remain forever chaotic
and refractory. In every science there are fundamental laws which are a priori
because they formulate just such definitive concepts or categorial tests by which
alone investigation becomes possible (MWO, p. 254).
As an example of such an operational a priori, Lewis discussed Einstein’s definition
of simultaneity for events at a distance in detail. For him, it was a stipulation that one
could make of one’s own free-will in order to arrive at a definition of simultaneity
(cf. MWO, p. 256). Hence, Einstein’s operational definition of simultaneity was an
a priori law. Only by presupposing such laws could one enter upon the investigation
by which further (empirical) laws were sought, which led him to make the following
sweeping generalization:
Indeed all definitions and all concepts exercise this function of prescribing fun-
damental law to whatever they denote, because everything which has a name is
to be identified with certainty only over some stretch of time (MWO, p. 257).
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The a priori element in knowledge is present whenever there is classification, inter-
pretation, or the distinction of real from unreal, which means that it is present in all
knowledge (cf. MWO, p. 266). Lewis vigorously endorsed the thesis that a priori laws
could be abandoned when the structure, which was built upon them, did not succeed
in simplifying our interpretation of the phenomena. Thereby, he arrived at a kind of
Kuhnian description of a revolutionary change in science forced by the pressure of
new “anomalic” experience that does not fit well in the old framework:
Beyond the principles of logic and pure mathematics … there must be further
and more particular criteria of the real prior to any investigation of nature. Such
definitions, fundamental principles and criteria the mind itself must supply before
experiences can even begin to be intelligible. These represent more or less deep-
lying attitudes, which the human mind has taken in the light of its total experience
up to date. But a newer and wider experience may bring about some alteration of
these attitudes even though by themselves they dictate nothing as to the content
of experience, and no experience can conceivably prove them invalid (MWO, p.
266).
Even if Lewis did not use this term, his account of a comprehensive a priori, which goes
well beyond formal logic and mathematics, points towards a sort of transcendental
logic similar to the one that Cassirer had put forward in his programmatic paper
Cassirer (1907).
This brief survey of Lewis’s pragmatic a priori suggests that it sketches a framework
for the conceptual and practical activities and operations of a community of scientists
for some time. The pragmatic a priori determined what was to be understood as a mean-
ingful problem, what counted as a solution, what methods were considered admissible
and what were the standards according to which the results were assessed. If the pres-
sure of recalcitrant experiences became too strong, it could be given up and replaced
by another other experiences. In summary, the Lewisian a priori exhibited certain sim-
ilarities to a Kuhnian paradigm (cf. Kuhn 1962), although Lewis remains much less
specific than Kuhn.24
In the paper Contingent Arguments for Metaphysical Principles (Chang 2008), the
author endeavors to update Kant’s transcendental arguments for the a priori in such a
way that they take into account particular and contingent epistemic circumstances of
the cognizing subject. According to Chang, such contingent arguments for metaphys-
ical principles may be cast in the following form (cf. Chang 2008, p. 113).
If we want to engage in a certain epistemic activity, then we must
presume the truth of some metaphysical principles.
24 An anonymous referee pointed out that Lewis’s a priori is perhaps even closer to Hacking’s concept
of a "style of reasoning”. Although this claim may be true, it should be noted that Hacking vigorously
denies being a pragmatist despite subscribing to some theses of pragmatism. See his paper On not Being
a pragmatist (Hacking 2007), which may be read as a short intellectual autobiography. There, he admits
to have some admiration for Peirce and to owe some useful phrases to Dewey. C.I. Lewis, however, is not
mentioned even once.
For a detailed discussion of Hacking’s notion of “style” and its relation to notions such as Fleck’s
“thought style” in the landscape of historical epistemology, see Sciortino (2017), who proposes to conceive
Hacking’s notion of “style” as a historized Kantian approach.
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As a point of departure, Chang takes Lewis’s “conceptual pragmatism” based on the
central notion of the “pragmatic a priori” and goes further to propose that giving an
account of the “epistemic and conceptualizing activities of an embodied subject”, i.e.,
an epistemic subject that has to come to terms with the contingent conditions of a
spatio-temporal material world in which it is living, is an essential task of a theory of
the pragmatic a priori.
For such a subject, the a priori makes sense only in a contingent way, not as a
universal condition of cognition in general, but as a local factor of particular brands
of cognition (ibid. 122). Chang criticizes Friedman for sticking too closely to the
Kantian universal and apodictic a priori and thereby ignoring the local character of
our cognition. More precisely, Kant is accused of having been too much impressed
by the then dominate Newtonianism, thereby conceiving some temporarily useful
scientific ideas of limited scope as deep general “metaphysical truths” (ibid. 114).
After these general remarks, let us now consider a simple example of Chang’s
“contingent transcendental If–then-arguments”, a version of which can already be
found in Lewis (cf. Lewis 1922, pp. 233–234):
If we want to count things, then we have to assume
that the domain of things to counted is discrete.
Otherwise, the activity of counting is not only impossible but also unintelligible. In
other words, discreteness of the domain to be counted is a metaphysical principle that
we have to presuppose if we want to engage in the activity of counting. This necessity
is a conditional pragmatic necessity. If we were jelly-fish, we would not engage in the
activity of counting (cf. Lewis 1926) because our surroundings cannot be meaningfully
conceptualized as discrete.
Counting is nothing but constructing a (partially defined) structure-preserving rep-
resentation of the domain D of elements to be counted to a “counting domain” N
consisting of natural numbers. A conditio sine qua non for the possibility of such a
representation is the discreteness of the domain D. As Chang notes, the principle of
discreteness is not empirical; it says nothing about the world itself, only that we need
to take it as discrete if we want to count objects (cf. Chang 2008, p. 123). Sometimes,
we may have some freedom to choose a discrete or continuous model. For instance,
we may take time as discrete, consisting of temporal moments, or as a continuum,
consisting of overlapping and infinitely divisible temporal intervals; similarly, space
may be taken as discrete, consisting of discrete spatial points, or as a continuum, the
basic constituents of which are infinitely divisible and overlapping regions.25
Among other things, a theory of the pragmatic a priori has the task of providing us
with a comprehensive list of “principle-activity” pairs (henceforth, P/A-pairs). Some
of those P/A-pairs are gathered in the following list (cf. Chang 2008, p. 125ff):
25 The relation between discrete and continuous conceptualizations may sometimes be rendered precise
with the help of “pointless” topology (cf. Gierz et al. 2005). More precisely, for a topological space X, one
may take discrete “points” x ∈ X or “regular open regions” U ∈ OX as basic building blocks of the space
X. For “well behaved spaces”, these two models are equivalent in a precise sense (cf. Gierz et al. 2005). As
is well known, the first to note this possibility, although in a somewhat vague manner, was Whitehead in
Process and Reality (Whitehead 1929 (1985)).
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• Discreteness/Counting • Uniform Consequence/Prediction
• Sufficient Reason/Explanation • Subsistence/Narration
• Transitivity/Ordering • Non-Contradiction/Assertion
… …
Cognitively relevant actions in sciences such as mathematics, physics, biology,
history or any other science presuppose the meaningfulness of activities like these.
For instance, the attempts of ordering objects, processes, etc. makes sense only if one
presupposes that the intended relation of ordering is transitive; or, if we are engaged in
giving explanations, we have to presuppose that there exist sufficient reasons for certain
states of affairs. Considering examples like these (cf. Mormann 2012a, b), it does
not seem too far-fetched to consider them all as some kind of structure-constituting
representations.
Doing science in some way or other cannot be described as carrying out any of
these activities in isolation. Rather, P/A-pairs show up in complex systems that can
be separated into isolated P/A-pairs as they appear in such a list only for methodolog-
ical reasons. It does not seem implausible to conceive such complex systems kinds
of Kuhnian paradigms that determine the scientific practice of a scientific community
at a certain time. A scientific revolution takes place when essential components of
such a system of P/A-pairs are replaced by new ones under the pressure of anoma-
lies.
An important trigger for changing an established system of pragmatic a priori
elements is the invention of new machines, new measuring instruments and new exper-
imental set ups. Such inventions often lead to totally new problems, perspectives, and
solutions. As examples, Lewis briefly mentioned the inventions of the telescope and
microscope that brought about permanent changes to our categories of perception (cf.
MWO, p. 268).
Since the advent of “Big Science”, the importance of this kind of an “instrumental
a priori” has steadily grown: one may think of a particle colliders or the new types
of protein sequencers in molecular biology. These machines allow us to formulate
questions and solve problems that did not make sense before these devices came
into being. Another type of machine-based pragmatic a priori is provided by the
various novel methods of calculation and simulation that are indispensable tools for
the constitution of many results in the advanced empirical sciences. Chang’s P/A-pairs
make explicit a priori principles that are necessary to carry out all kinds of epistemic
activities relevant for science.
Chang’s paper offers only a sketch of some of these P/A-pairs. Elaborating Chang’s
proposal would be the task for a comprehensive theory of the role of the a priori in
modern science. In Mormann (2012a, b), it is pointed out that Chang’s P/A-pairs may
be fruitfully related to some recent developments in cognitive science, in particu-
lar Lakoff’s and Núñez’s theory of conceptual metaphors that guide the contingent
embodied rationality of creatures like us (cf. Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Núñez 2000).
It is shown that conceptual metaphors, and thereby P/A-pairs, have an elegant formal
explication in terms of functors in the sense of category theory (cf. Awodey 2006; Mac
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Lane 1986).26 Here is no place to spell this explication out in detail, it may be enough
to say that such would bring us back to the topic with which we started, namely, the
issue of structure-preserving representations. After all, functors can be conceived as
partially structure-preserving maps between one local conceptual universe and another
(cf. Bell 1986).
Summarizing, we may say—against Rorty, who claimed the concept of representa-
tion to be obsolete—that there are good reasons to maintain the thesis that the issue of
representation will remain a central issue of philosophy of science and epistemology.
It seems plausible to conjecture that this thesis particularly holds due to the fact that
the issue of structure-preserving representation is closely related to classical philo-
sophical topics such as a theory of the a priori and a theory of constitution (cf. Carnap
1928; Coffa 1991, p. 214ff).
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